FAA response hinges on a defined VNAV drop-out

The condition follows three linked steps: an approach is discontinued, the crew subsequently edits the route stored in the system, and VNAV may cease operating. That defined sequence gives the FAA a bounded condition against which to assess the adequacy of the current response.

Boeing’s position is that losing VNAV does not also end autopilot operation. The aircraft instead moves to lower-level automation governing pitch. This limits the loss of automation, but it does not make autopilot continuity equivalent to continued vertical-navigation guidance.

The FAA is reviewing the deviation despite crew instructions already being available. Its stated decision encompasses regulator-mandated measures and possible revisions to operating authorisations. The agency has also said that establishing a safety issue would prompt intervention without delay.

For operators, the practical distinction is between managing the specified VNAV condition under current instructions and preparing for a compulsory change if the FAA alters requirements. Assuming that all automation is lost would overstate the known condition; relying on autopilot continuity alone would understate the loss of guidance.

The decisive evidence will be the FAA’s conclusion on whether the condition presents a safety issue and whether current instructions adequately address it. A requirement for new measures or revised authorisations would change the compliance constraint; absent that determination, retained autopilot capability alone does not resolve the review.